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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This case is on appeal from discovery and evidentiary rulings and a final
judgment and final order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County. Erkan Ereren, M.D., the plaintiff-appellant, appealed to the Utah
Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-2-2(j).
The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, transferred this appeal to this Court. This Court has jurisdiction
over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-2a-2(j).
II.
1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether, in this substantial personal injury case, the District

Court (Retired Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) committed reversible error in
denying Dr. Ereren's Motion to Compel substantive responses to discovery
requests submitted to defendant-appellee, Snowbird Corporation, and geared
toward discovering the identity of the Snowbird skiing instructor who
positioned Dr. Ereren in a dangerous location and toward discovering the
identity of witnesses to the incident who would have corroborated Dr. Ereren's
account.
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Typically, denial of a motion to compel discovery is viewed under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. E.g., Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409, 414
(Utah 1998), but the question here may be one of law that should be reviewed
under a simple correctness standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
1994); Roundv v. Stalev, 984 P.2d 404, 406 (Utah 1999).

1

Prejudice is presumed if the trial court's ruling is determined to have
been erroneous, unless it is shown that the error is harmless. "The burden of
demonstrating that the erroneous denial of a discovery request was not
prejudicial must ... rest with the party resisting discovery." Askew v. Hardman,
884 P.2d 1258, 1262-63 (Utah App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 918 P.2d
469 (Utah 1996).
The issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by Dr. Ereren's
filing and serving Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendant to Answer
Interrogatories Set Forth in Plaintiffs First and Second Sets of Interrogatories
and to Produce Documents Requested in Plaintiffs First and Second Requests
for Production of Documents (R. 52-67); his Memorandum in Support of that
Motion (R. 68-75); his Reply Memorandum in support of that Motion (R. 12748); Judge Wilkinson's "4-501 Ruling" on that Motion (R. 156-57); Judge
Wilkinson's Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Defendant to Answer
Interrogatories Set Forth in Plaintiffs First and Second Sets of Interrogatories
and to Produce Documents Requested in Plaintiffs First and Second Request
for Production of Documents Dated February 16, 2000 (R. 835-36); Plaintiffs
Motion for New Trial (R. 1278-79); the Memorandum in Support of that Motion
(R. 1280-89); the Reply Memorandum in support of that Motion (R. 1364-74);
Judge Roger A. Livingston's minute entry denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for New
Trial (R. 1384-85); and Judge Livingston's Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for
New Trial (R. 1386-88).

2

2.

Whether the District Court (Judge Livingston) committed reversible

error in allowing, in the face of Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence,
extrinsic "specific instance" evidence of Dr. Ereren's supposed dishonesty
regarding the financial standing of his medical business.
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue
may be one of abuse of discretion [e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah
1994), but may be, for this particular evidentiary issue (given the clear
language of that Rule), de novo review of a question of law.
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by
Dr. Ereren's filing and pursuit of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (R. 973-75); the
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (R. 976-86); the Reply
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion in Limine (R. 1080-91); oral
argument prior to the testimony of Snowbird's C.P.A. witness, Rick Hoffman (R.
1414, Tr. 725-37); Judge Livingston's trial ruling on this evidentiary issue (R.
1414, Tr. 730-37); Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (R. 1278-79); the
Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. 1280-89); the Reply Memorandum
in support of that Motion (R. 1364-74); Judge Livingston's minute entry
denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for New Trial (R. 1384-85); and Judge Livingston's
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (R. 1386-88).
3.

Whether the District Court (Judge Livingston) committed reversible

error in allowing evidence regarding Dr. Ereren's bankruptcy and gambling
history.
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APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue
appears to be one of abuse of discretion {e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938
(Utah 1994)).
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by
Dr. Ereren's filing and pursuit of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine (R. 973-75); the
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine (R. 976-86); the Reply
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine (R. 1080-91); pre-trial
oral argument on the subject parts of that Motion (R. 1410, Tr. 30-36; 55-62;
77-78); Judge Livingston's pre-trial ruling on the subject part of that Motion (R.
1411, Tr. 10; 12-14); Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (R. 1278-79); the
Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. 1280-89); the Reply Memorandum
in support of that Motion (R. 1364-74); Judge Livingston's minute entry
denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for New Trial (R. 1384-85); and Judge Livingston's
Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (R. 1386-88).
4.

Whether the District Court (Judge Livingston) committed reversible

error in excluding Dr. Ereren's proffered rebuttal evidence, regarding the high
incidence of jumping in the location where Dr. Ereren testified the ski
instructor had positioned him, the admission of which would have made
Dr. Ereren's account more credible and the testimony of Snowbird personnel
less credible.
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APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue
appears to be one of abuse of discretion {e.g., State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938
(Utah 1994)).
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by oral
argument and proffer (R. 1412, Tr. 404-12) and Judge Livingston's trial ruling
that the proffered evidence would not be received (R. 1412, Tr. 412-15).
5.

Whether the District Court (Judge Livingston) committed reversible

error in denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for New Trial (Judgment (R. at 1266-69)
having been entered on the Special Verdict (R. at 1257-59), by which the jury
reflected its acceptance of Snowbird's contention that Dr. Ereren had not
carried his burden of proof that he was injured while in a Snowbird ski class).
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue
appears to be whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion in
denying the Motion for New Trial. E.g., Amoss v. Bennion, 517 P.2d 1008,
1010 (Utah 1973).
This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by
Dr. Ereren's filing and pursuit of his Motion for New Trial (R. 1278-79); the
Memorandum in Support of that Motion (R. 1280-89); the Reply Memorandum
in support of that Motion (R. 1364-74); the Affidavit of Peter C. Collins (R.
1290-92); the Affidavit of David M. Bernstein (R. 1357-59); Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike Affidavit of Peter C. Collins (R.
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1360-63); the Post-Trial Affidavit of Erkan Ereren, M.D. (R. 1375-77); the
Clarifying and Supplemental Affidavit of Peter G. Collins (R. 1378-80); Judge
Livingston's minute entry denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for New Trial (R. 138485); and Judge Livingston's Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (R.
1386-88).
III.

RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF
OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL

Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent
part:
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance
with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1)

In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action, whether it
relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any books, documents, or
other tangible things and the identify and location of
persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.
It is not ground for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides, in pertinent part:
Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence.
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides, in pertinent part:
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
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Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
(a)
Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 6 1 , a new
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part of the issues, for any of the following causes...:
(1)

Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.

(7)

Error in law.
IV,

A,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF PROCEEDING

This Appeal is from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, on a
jury verdict in favor of Snowbird, and from various rulings and orders and a
final Order of the Third Judicial District Court denying Dr. Ereren's post-trial
Rule 59 Motion for New Trial in this substantial negligence/personal injuiy
action.
B.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND BRIEF HISTORY OF
PROCEEDINGS

On March 9, 1995, Dr. Ereren, a general surgeon, was skiing at the
Snowbird ski resort. He alleged in his Amended Complaint (R. 30-34) and
testified, in his deposition and in the trial proceedings held herein (on
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February 26-March 1, 2001), that, while in a Snowbird ski class and while in
the unsafe location in which a female Snowbird ski instructor had placed him,
an airborne snowboarder landed on him (R. 1412, Tr. 454; 457-62). Dr. Ereren
sustained, in the incident, a serious and debilitating neck injury that
ultimately required surgery.
Dr. Ereren, a native of Turkey, testified that his ski instructor was a
female and that her first or last name was something like "Laura" or "Lauren"
(R. 1412, Tr. 441). He also testified that a Florida radiologist, whose first or
last name was "Scott," was, along with his ("Dr. Scott's") wife, in his ski class
(R. 1412, Tr. 445-46; 462-63) at the time the incident occurred.
Dr. Ereren brought this action seeking to recover compensation for his
injuries and damages sustained in the incident. Snowbird's primary defense
was that the incident did not occur.
While this action was still pending before the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson, Dr. Ereren propounded discovery requests geared, among other
things, toward discovering the identity of his ski instructor and the identities of
"Dr. Scott" and his wife. The subject discovery requests and defendant's
subject responses (discussed in the parties' respective papers at, e.g., R. 52-73;
78-126; 127-48) are the following:
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Identify, by name, address, and
telephone number, every ski instructor working in your
employ as of March 8, 1995 and state, for each such person,
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whether that person conducted any group ski lessons, at the
Snowbird ski area, on that day. l
OBJECTION AND ANSWER: Counsel for Defendant objects
to information requested by Interrogatory No. 12 on the
grounds that it is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and
requests information which should be known to Plaintiff.
Without waiving its objection, Defendant attaches hereto a
copy of a daily log for Wednesday, March 8, 1995 2 showing
the names of the instructors, the level of the class taught,
and the number of students in the class. If Plaintiff can
provide a physical description of the ski instructor and more
specific information regarding the number of people in the
class, the location of the class, and the names of the others
in the class, it would assist in locating the name of the
instructor whom Plaintiff claims to have been his on the day
in question.
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Identify, by name, address, and
telephone number, every person who took one or more ski
lessons at Snowbird at any time from March 5 through
March 10, 1995, and, for each such person, state the type of
lesson or lessons taken, the name or names of that person's
instructor or instructors, and the date or dates on which ski
lesson or lessons was or were taken.
OBJECTION: Counsel for Defendant objects to this
Interrogatory on the grounds that it is unreasonably
burdensome, overly broad, and not reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST NO. 18: All documents referenced in your
Answers to, and/or pertinent to, any of Plaintiffs First Set of
Interrogatories, of even date herewith.
RESPONSE: See Answers and Objections to Interrogatories.

1

Dr. Ereren later informed Snowbird, through counsel, that he required identification of only
female ski instructors.
2

Snowbird also produced a copy of the daily log for Thursday, March 9, 1995 (the correct date
of the subject incident).
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PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF
INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: State the name and address and
phone number, as of that time, of eveiy person who gave a
Florida address and who stayed at the Cliff Lodge a n d / o r
any other lodging facility operated by you at any time
between March 1 and March 10, 1995.
OBJECTION: Plaintiffs Interrogatory is overly broad, unduly
burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. Moreover, Plaintiffs
request is an invasion of the expectation of privacy that other
hotel guests have with regard to their addresses and phone
numbers.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: State the name and address and
phone number as of that time, of every person who you have
reason to think, from seminar attendee records, registration
records, and/or otherwise, was a physician and who stayed
at the Cliff Lodge a n d / o r other lodging facility operated by
you at any time between March 1 and March 10, 1995.
OBJECTION: Plaintiffs Interrogatory is overly broad, unduly
burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. Moreover, Plaintiffs
request is an invasion of the expectation of privacy that other
hotel guests have with regard to their addresses and phone
numbers.
Dr. Ereren's counsel then, after unsuccessfully trying informally to
persuade Snowbird's counsel voluntarily to provide the requested information
and documentation, and recognizing the significance of obtaining corroboration
of Dr. Ereren's account (Snowbird's counsel had by then informed Dr. Ereren's
counsel that there was no record of the incident), filed a Motion to Compel and
supporting Memorandum (R. 52-73), in which he pledged not to use the
requested information and documentation for any improper purposes and
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agreed (R. 72), if necessary, to have a protective order entered that would limit
the use of the information and documentation to this litigation only.
Snowbird, stating "[o]ne of the central issues of this case is plaintiffs
credibility" (R. 80; emphasis added), opposed that Motion, on purported bases
including the "privacy" interests of its instructors and guests [id.].
Without having heard oral argument, by minute entry and without
explanation (R. 156-57), 3 Judge Wilkinson denied that Motion to Compel.
Dr. Ereren's counsel was unsuccessful in his efforts to convince
defendant's counsel that Judge Wilkinson's ruling was erroneous, and
Dr. Ereren had to proceed to trial without the benefit of the facts and
documents that would presumably have led to the discovery of the identity of
the ski instructor and of Dr. Scott and his wife.
Prior to trial, Dr. Ereren filed a Motion in Limine (R. 973-75), supported
by two Memoranda (R. 576-86; 1080-91), directed mainly at preventing
Snowbird from engaging in a campaign of character assassination and unfair
attack on Dr. Ereren's credibility rather than fairly contesting the real issues in
this case. Over Dr. Ereren's Motion in Limine and accepting Snowbird's
disingenuous 4 argument (R. 1410, Tr. 63-72; 75-76) that such things would
have considerable bearing on Dr. Ereren's damages claims, Judge Livingston
determined (R. 1410, Tr. 7 1 ; 80-82; R. 1411, Tr. 10-12) to allow presentation of
3

Judge Wilkinson later signed an Order (R. 833-34) that formalized that ruling.

4

It is noteworthy that Snowbird, showing the real reason why it wanted to introduce all the
bad stuff it could about Dr. Ereren, acknowledged (R. 1023-24) in its Memorandum in
Opposition to that Motion in Limine, that "[tjhe core issue for the jury in this case is whether
Dr. Ereren's testimony as to the incident is credible." (Emphasis added.)
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evidence regarding Dr. Ereren's gambling and bankruptcy history. Dr. Ereren
was in fact examined about his gambling history (e.g., R. 1413, Tr. 527; 530;
532) and about his bankruptcy {e.g., R. 1413, Tr. 531-34, including references
to the discharging of gambling and other debts).
During trial, Judge Livingston (R. 1414, Tr. 725-36; 752-53) allowed
Snowbird, over Dr. Ereren's objections, and accepting Snowbird's contention
that the evidence would go to Dr. Ereren's damages, 5 to present, in conflict
with Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, extrinsic "specific instance"
evidence, in the nature of the testimony of, and exhibits introduced through,
witness Rick Hoffman, C.P.A. (R. 1414, Tr. 745-51; Exhibits 35, 36), dealing
with Dr. Ereren's supposedly shady financial reporting practices.
Near the beginning of his closing argument, Snowbird's counsel stated:
T m not going to talk about damages, because I think this is a liability case...."
R. 1414, Tr. 871 (emphasis added).
During trial, Judge Livingston denied (R. 1412, Tr. 412-15) Dr. Ereren's
attempt to present evidence, proffered for the purpose of rebutting Snowbird
testimony that had already come in (purporting to show the improbability of
Dr. Ereren's account) that skiers and snowboarders rarely, if ever, jumped in
the general location where Dr. Ereren testified he had been placed by the ski

5

It is noteworthy that Snowbird's true purpose of putting such things before the jury, to attack
Dr. Ereren's credibility, was shown by Snowbird's counsel's statement (R. 1414, Tr. 728) that
it's clearly inappropriate from any business accounting point of view — to have two
financial statements dated the same time, one used for a loan purpose and the other
used for I.R.S. purposes.
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instructor, on the basis that the identity of the proposed rebuttal witness (local
lawyer and skier, Bob Gilchrist) had not been disclosed prior to trial.
After deliberating approximately three hours, the jury (with two of its
members disagreeing) answered in the negative to the first question on the
Special Verdict form, which question asked, in essence, whether Dr. Ereren
was telling the truth. The question was the following:
1.

Was plaintiff struck by an airborne snowboarder while
in a ski class as he alleges at Snowbird in March,
1995?

R. 1257. Having so answered that question, the jury needed to answer no
further questions on the verdict form. Snowbird had prevailed before the jury.
On March 29, 2001, Judge Livingston entered the Judgment on Special
Verdict (R. 1266-1269). On April 6, 2001, Dr. Ereren filed his Motion for New
Trial (R. 1384-85) and supporting Memorandum (R. 1280-89), urging Judge
Livingston to grant him a new trial based on such things as Judge Wilkinson's
refusal to compel discovery responses that would presumably have led to the
discovery of evidence corroborative of Dr. Ereren's account of the accident;
Judge Livingston's erroneously allowing Snowbird to attack Dr. Ereren ? s
character and credibility; and Judge Livingston's refusal to allow Dr. Ereren to
present the rebuttal evidence he sought to present. Snowbird opposed that
Motion (R. 1294-1353). Dr. Ereren submitted a Reply Memorandum in
Support of that Motion (R. 1364-74). Judge Livingston denied that Motion by
Order dated May 23, 2001 (R. 1386-88).
Dr. Ereren filed his Notice of Appeal on J u n e 13, 2001 (R. 1394-95).
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V.
1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Dr. Ereren had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that he was injured by an airborne snowboarder while he was in a
Snowbird ski class. Snowbird denied the incident occurred, so he needed
corroboration of his account to sustain that burden. Dr. Ereren's ski
instructor was a female. A male radiologist named "Scott," who Dr. Ereren
believes was from Florida, and "Dr Scott's" wife witnessed the incident.
Snowbird presumably had information, in the nature of names, addresses,
a n d / o r phone numbers of all of its 1994-95 season female ski instructors, and
of people who bought ski school tickets, people who were Florida residents, and
people who were physicians who stayed at Snowbird during March 1-10, 1995.
Snowbird should have been compelled to provide information regarding its ski
instructors and such other people. It was error for Judge Wilkinson to side
with Snowbird on those discovery issues, and his ruling in that regard was
prejudicial error.
2.

Dr. Ereren's credibility was, as Snowbird has acknowledged (see,

e.g., discussion at page 11 and note 4 (p. 11), supra), the central issue in this
case. Judge Livingston erroneously allowed Snowbird to present evidence
regarding Dr. Ereren's gambling and bankruptcy and to present extrinsic
evidence of Dr. Ereren's supposed shady financial reporting. Such things
supposedly (according to Snowbird's counsel's representations) dealt with
Dr. Ereren's damages. They were all, in fact, irrelevant, under the law on
which the juiy was correctly instructed, to damages issues. Snowbird
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inappropriately and successfully used such things to impugn Dr. Ereren's
credibility. It was reversible error for Judge Livingston to allow such evidence;
and those rulings and Snowbird's conduct in presenting such evidence under
false "damages" pretenses entitle Dr. Ereren, under Rule 59(a)(1), to a new
trial.
3.

Judge Livingston erred, and prejudicially so, when he refused

Dr. Ereren's request to present rebuttal evidence. Dr. Ereren's claim is that a
snowboarder had become airborne and landed on him just below a "cat track"
at Snowbird. Snowbird presented testimony that jumping in the area
described by Dr. Ereren does not occur or occurs only infrequently. The
proposed rebuttal testimony (whose necessity was unknown prior to trial Dr. Ereren's counsel had assumed Snowbird's witnesses would be forthright on
the question) was important to the overall credibility of Dr. Ereren's case and
the lack of credibility of Snowbird's case and should have been permitted.
4.

Judge Livingston erred in denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for New

5.

This Court should order a new trial, should direct that Snowbird

Trial.

be required to provide substantive responses to the subject discovery requests,
and should direct that, on retrial, Snowbird not be allowed to present evidence
of Dr. Ereren's gambling or bankruptcy history or of his supposedly
questionable financial reporting practices.
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VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

JUDGE WILKINSON ERRONEOUSLY DENIED DR. EREREN'S
MOTION TO COMPEL. THAT RULING CONSTITUTES
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ENTITLES DR. EREREN TO A NEW
TRIAL.

The subject discovery requests, set forth at pages 8-10 hereof, were
geared toward discovering information crucial to Dr. Ereren's case. As the
Court will readily observe, those requests were directed toward determining the
identity of the ski instructor who placed Dr. Ereren where she placed him and
the identities of "Dr. Scott" and his wife, the people who (R. 1412, Tr. at 462),
along with the ski instructor, were present when the incident occurred.
Without corroborating evidence from anyone who was present when the
incident occurred, Dr. Ereren had the most difficult task, which the jury
determined had not been accomplished, of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the incident had occurred.
Snowbird's responses to the subject discovery requests (also set forth on
pages 8-10 hereof) are most unsatisfactory. The only supposedly substantive
response (set forth in the Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 12 of
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories) is the reference to the contents of the
March 8, 1995 ski instructor daily log provided by Snowbird (Exs. 10, 10A).
(Snowbird later provided a daily log for the date of the incident, March 9, 1995
(Exs. 9, 9A). Snowbird also later provided a photo array (Ex. 1) of some of its
female ski instructors who taught during the 1994-95 season.)
The unsatisfactoriness and incompleteness of Snowbird's response is
demonstrated by the fact that the Snowbird ski school director (R. 1412, Tr.
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359), Steve Bills, acknowledged that the daily logs are not (R. 1412, Tr. 375-76)
necessarily completely accurate; by the fact that Shirley Durtschi, a Snowbird
ski instructor during the 1994-95 season (R. 1412, Tr. 299) , testified that
other records, prepared by individual ski instructors and turned in at the end
of each teaching day, in a different format from the daily logs produced by
Snowbird, reflecting the identities of instructors and the numbers of students
taught on that day, are created by the instructors and then turned in to
Snowbird (R. 1412, Tr. 305-307); 6 by the fact that Dr. Ereren did the best he
could with respect to providing, many years after the incident occurred, a
physical description of his teacher {e.g., R. 1412, Tr. 441-42; 448), in response
to Snowbird's suggestion in its Objection and Answer (p. 9 hereof); by the fact
that a photo array provided by Snowbird (Ex. 1) included the faces of only 42 of
the probably more than 75 female instructors who taught at Snowbird during
the 1994-95 season (R. 1411, Tr. at 231); by the fact that Georgia Dumais, a
long-time (R. 1412, Tr. 350-51) Snowbird ski instructor, could not recognize
the faces of all of those 42 instructors (R. 1412, Tr. 336); by the fact that
Ms. Durtschi mistakenly identified one of the instructors whose face appears in
Exhibit 1 as someone named "Laura" (R. 1412, Tr. 303-05); by the fact that the
face of Nancy "Highpockets" Thorson, the instructor who taught Dr. Ereren's
wife (in a different class) on the day in question (R. 1412, Tr. 373), does not

6

It is noteworthy that Ms. Durtschi testified that she believes that Snowbird keeps those
records indefinitely or for at least six years (R. 1412, Tr. 307; 318-19), that the trial of this case
took place within six years of the date of the incident, and that Snowbird never produced such
documents.
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appear in that photo array (R. 1412, 367-68); by the fact that Dr. Ereren
testified (R. 1414, Tr. 442) that neither Ms. Dumais nor Ms. Durtschi (the
instructors that Snowbird claimed were the only candidates, based on the daily
logs, for the position) appeared to be the instructor in question; and by the fact
that both Ms. Dumais (e.g., R. 1412, Tr. 373) and Ms. Durtschi (id.) denied that
they were the ski instructor in question.
If Dr. Ereren, who (R. 72) agreed to refrain from using information
obtained for any improper purpose and for any purpose other than this
litigation, had been given appropriate access to the information requested, he
would presumably have been able to determine the true identity of the
instructor.
Snowbird provided no information, other than limited and unsatisfactory
documentation (R. 1414, Tr. 782-83) regarding medical conferences, 7 in
response to Dr. Ereren's discovery requests that sought to learn the identities
and whereabouts of Dr. Scott and his wife. Interrogatory No. 14 of Dr. Ereren's
First Set of Interrogatories and Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2 of Dr. Ereren's
Second Set of Interrogatories (pp. 9-10 hereof) were geared toward determining
the identity of those witnesses. Nowhere in Snowbird's objections to those
requests is it suggested that the information sought by Dr. Ereren was not
available to Snowbird.

7

No addresses for the organizations sponsoring those conferences were provided by Snowbird
(R. 1412, Tr. 449). Dr. Ereren's own considerable efforts to find "Dr. Scott" are discussed at R.
1412, Tr. 446-49.
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Dr. Ereren sought, in Interrogatory No. 14 of his First Set of
Interrogatories, in connection with his quest to locate those witnesses,
information regarding persons who had taken ski lessons at Snowbird on the
day in question. Snowbird's contention that the request was "not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence" is as wrongheaded
as its Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 12 of Dr. Ereren ? s First Set of
Interrogatories (the one geared toward determining the identity of the ski
instructor in question) that that information "should be known to Plaintiff."
Snowbird's Objection, on the basis of supposed "invasion of privacy" (among
other untenable supposed bases), to Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2 of
Dr. Ereren's Second Set of Interrogatories, which sought information regarding
people who gave Florida addresses ("Dr. Scott" was, to Dr. Ereren's recollection
(R. 1412, Tr. 445-46), a radiologist from Florida) and who stayed at Snowbird
during the subject period, and regarding physicians who stayed at Snowbird
during that period, demonstrates Snowbird's fundamental misunderstanding,
or intentional distortion, of the rules governing discovery. If Snowbird were
correct in its "invasion of privacy" contention, any party to any lawsuit could
successfully refuse to provide information and documentation that would help
the opposition, simply on the basis that a non-party witness whose identity
would, through the discovery process, come to the attention of the requesting
party might be bothered or inconvenienced. That is not and cannot be the law.
It should be noted, in connection with the matter of information and
documents pertinent to the identities of "Dr. Scott" and his wife, and in light of
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the breadth of Dr. Ereren's request for information and documentation geared
toward discovering the identities of those witnesses, that Snowbird never
produced a document that by Snowbird's own acknowledgment once existed
and that would conceivably have shed considerable light on the identities of
"Dr. Scott" and his wife. Snowbird keeps records reflecting the purchase of ski
school tickets. Exhibit 2 A, also enlarged as Exhibit 2, show the names of
people who bought ski tickets on March 8, 1995 (R. 1412, Tr. 363).
Dr. Ereren's name appears on that document. Ski school tickets bought one
day can be used on that day or on any subsequent day (e.g., R. 1412, Tr. 36364 (testimony of Snowbird's Steve Bills)). Dr. Ereren testified (R. 1413, Tr. 481)
that he believes that he bought a ski school ticket on March 9 t h for his
March 9 t h instruction. Dr. Scott, with whom Dr. Ereren testified he only skied
on March 9 t h (Tr. 444), may well have bought his ski school ticket on
March 9 t h . The document reflecting ski school tickets bought on March 9 t h has
never been produced by Snowbird, although Mr. Bills (R. 1412, Tr. 365)
testified that he believes that Snowbird located that document. Robert Black,
Snowbird's "director of mountain operations" (R. 1411, Tr. 209), testified (R.
1414, Tr. 801-02) that the hard copy of that document was apparently lost
during a Snowbird move. Mr. Black also acknowledged that that is a
computer-generated document (R. 1414, Tr. 802). Computer-generated
documents can almost always be re-created, and Snowbird gave no explanation
for why the one in question could not be re-created (if, in fact, and contrary to
Mr. Bills's stated belief, it had not indeed been located).
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Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, set forth verbatim at p. 6
hereof, makes clear the breadth of the discovery rules. Snowbird's contention
that Dr. Ereren was not entitled to discover information reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of the identity of the ski instructor and the identities of
Dr. Scott and his wife, in the face of the language of the Rule and the liberal
approach to discovery that forms the jurisprudential basis for the Rule, holds
no water. Judge Wilkinson's ruling that Dr. Ereren was not entitled to the
subject information and documentation was flatly erroneous.
This Court, in Askew v. Hardman, 884 P.2d 1258, 1262-63 (Utah App.
1994), rev'd on other grounds, 918 P.2d 469 (Utah 1996), made it abundantly
clear that an erroneous discovery ruling that prevents a party from obtaining
discoverable information is presumed to be prejudicial error, entitling the
requesting party, if unsuccessful at trial, to a new trial unless the withholding
party can sustain its burden of showing that its withholding of requested
information was not prejudicial. This Court held, in Askew:
[T]he usual harmless-error analysis is inapposite where the
trial court has erroneously denied a discovery request. In
such situations, this court is required to presume prejudice
unless it is shown that the denial was harmless. Weahkee v.
Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1083 (10 th Cir. 1980); accord
Shaklee Corp. v. Gunnell, 748 F.2d 548, 550 (10 th Cir.
1984). Prejudice is presumed because to require the
requesting party to show that the error was harmful would
place the requesting party in the untenable position of
having to demonstrate that the contents of inaccessible
information would have affected the outcome of a case.
Because the requesting party does not have the information,
he or she will never be able to demonstrate that the trial
court's erroneous denial of a discovery request was anything
but harmless. 611 The burden of demonstrating that the
erroneous denial of a discovery request was not prejudicial
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m u s t therefore rest with the party resisting discovery. See,
In re California Public Utilities Common, 892 F.2d 778, 78384 (9 th Cir. 1989). Where we cannot determine from the
record whether the requested documents might have
changed the outcome of the trial, we cannot say that the
error was harmless. Weahkee, 621 F.2d at 1083; Shaklee
Corp., 748 F.2d at 550. Because defendant has not
demonstrated that the denial of plaintiffs discovery request
was not prejudicial, and because we cannot determine from
the record whether the requested documents would have
changed the outcome of the case, the trial court committed
prejudicial error in denying plaintiffs discovery request.
fal

In some settings, a trial judge might examine documents
in camera to determine the import of their contents.
However, this approach is unsatisfactory in this context. We
are concerned not only with whether the requested
information on its face might change the outcome of the
trial, but also with what impact discovery of that information
might have had on trial counsel's overall preparation and
conduct of the trial. Only in the most clear-cut cases could
any judge, without the benefit of trial counsel's thinking and
strategy, make a determination as to whether information
and the documents could aid the requesting party.

(Emphasis added.)
It is difficult to conceive of a situation more tailored to the rule of Askew
than is the instant situation. Snowbird's primary defense to Dr. Ereren's
claim, and the basis of the jury's verdict, was that the incident never occurred.
See, e.g., footnote 4, supra, page 11; and see the one question answered by the
jury on the verdict form (R. 1257). The very purpose of the subject discovery
requests was to obtain corroboration of Dr. Ereren's account. Snowbird cannot
carry its burden, under Askew, of showing that Judge Wilkinson's discovery
ruling, patently erroneous under either an abuse-of-discretion standard or a
"correctness" standard, was harmless. This Court should, on the strength of
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this Point A of this Argument alone - and regardless of its analysis of the
balance of this Argument - order, as this Court did in Askew, a new trial.
B.

JUDGE LIVINGSTON COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ALLOWING, IN THE FACE OF RULE 608(b) OF THE UTAH
RULES OF EVIDENCE, EXTRINSIC "SPECIFIC INSTANCE"
EVIDENCE OF DR. EREREN'S SUPPOSED DISHONESTY
REGARDING THE FINANCIAL STANDING OF HIS MEDICAL
BUSINESS.

Rule 608(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, provides, in pertinent part:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may
not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
(Emphasis added.)
"Extrinsic evidence" is "evidence offered other than through the witness
himself." 1 John W. Strong, McCormick on Evidence, §49 (4 th ed. 1992).
Dr. Ereren has been convicted of no crime. Accordingly, and as
explained to Judge Livingston by Dr. Ereren's counsel (R. 1414, Tr. 725-26;
733; 736-37), it was impermissible, under Rule 608(b), for Snowbird to put on
extrinsic evidence, through its C.P.A. witness, Rick Hoffman, of Dr. Ereren's
supposed improprieties and dishonesty (in this case in which Snowbird hung
its defense on Dr. Ereren's supposed lack of credibility), regarding his use of
two sets of numbers concerning his medical business, one for internal and
I.R.S. purposes and one for use in obtaining loans. The subject parts of
Mr. Hoffman's testimony are set forth at R. 1414, Tr. 745-53. The subject
exhibits are Exhibits 35 and 36. The focus of Mr. Hoffman's work was on the
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years 1991-94 (R. 1414, Tr. 743), a period prior to the occurrence of the
subject incident.
This was clearly extrinsic evidence and it was clearly offered for the
purpose of attacking Dr. Ereren's credibility. Snowbird's counsel argued in the
pre-trial proceedings and at trial, and is expected to argue in this Appeal, that
such evidence was offered for purposes of contesting Dr. Ereren's damages
claim, and it was on that basis (R. 1414, Tr. 730-31; 735) that Judge
Livingston allowed this evidence; but there is no logical link between
presentation of this kind of evidence and the amount of Dr. Ereren's damages
sustained as a result of the subject incident. The subject jury instructions on
damages, to which Snowbird stipulated, are the following:
Instruction No. 33
The total amount of a plaintiffs past special damages is the
amount that will reasonably compensate him for (1) the cost
of medical, surgical, and other health care and related
expenses reasonably required and actually provided in the
diagnosis, care, and treatment of him to the present time;
plus (2) his loss of income and earning capacity to date.
Instruction No. 35
The total amount of a plaintiff s future special damages is
the amount that will reasonably compensate him for his loss
of future income and earning capacity.
R. 1243, 1245 (some emphasis added).
Not only did the subject extrinsic evidence have nothing to do with
Dr. Ereren's damages. Snowbird's counsel (R. 1414, Tr. 728) let slip, in his
remarks concerning Mr. Hoffman's testimony quoted in footnote 5, supra, p.
12, the real reason for wanting to get this evidence in front of the jury. Also,
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after all the discussions, prior to trial and during the trial, about the supposed
legitimacy of getting into such things, Snowbird's counsel said nothing
whatsoever, in his closing argument, regarding Dr. Ereren's damages.
The real purpose for Snowbird's introduction of the subject evidence was
to attack Dr. Ereren's credibility. The evidence was clearly extrinsic. Its
admission was erroneous. Judge Livingston had no discretion to allow it. If he
did, he abused that discretion. The evidence, which went to the heart of
Snowbird's Dr. Ereren's-lack-of-credibility defense, was not harmless. In any
event, Snowbird's introduction of the evidence, under the false pretense of
using it to attack Dr. Ereren's damages case, constituted Rule 59(a)(1)
"irregularity in the proceedings ... of an adverse party." Dr. Ereren is, on the
basis of all or any of these bases, entitled to a new trial.
C.

JUDGE LIVINGSTON COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ALLOWING EVIDENCE REGARDING DR. EREREN'S
BANKRUPTCY AND GAMBLING HISTORY.

Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, set forth verbatim at page 6
hereof, provides that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Dr. Ereren
acknowledges that, unlike Rule 608(b), dealing with extrinsic evidence such as
that presented by and through Mr. Hoffman, Rule 403 allows a trial court to
exercise its discretion in determining whether the probative value of evidence is
outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial nature. Evidence of Dr. Ereren's
gambling history and of the fact that he sought protection of the federal
bankruptcy laws (if, indeed, even relevant and if, indeed, it should not have
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been excluded under Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence) was unfairly
prejudicial, and extraordinarily so, on its face; its probative value, if any, was
minimal. Such things, like Mr. Hoffman's evidence, were ostensibly offered by
Snowbird, and allowed by Judge Livingston, on the supposed basis that they
would assist Snowbird in defending against Dr. Ereren's damages claim. As
with the evidence introduced by and through Mr. Hoffman, however, they had
nothing to do with Dr. Ereren's damages claims. Dr. Ereren won and, more
often, lost, as a high-stakes gambler, both before and after the subject incident.
He never claimed that the subject incident caused him to go into bankruptcy.
Snowbird elicited testimony from Dr. Ereren (R. 1413, Tr. 531-34) that he had
discharged, through his bankruptcy, debts including but not limited to
gambling debts. The true purpose of Snowbird's wanting to get into
Dr. Ereren's gambling history and bankruptcy was to prejudice the jury against
Dr. Ereren. Again, Snowbird's counsel argued nothing about Dr. Ereren's
damages in his closing argument. It was an abuse of discretion for Judge
Livingston to allow evidence of Dr. Ereren's gambling and bankruptcy, that
abuse of discretion was not harmless, and that abuse of discretion, as well as
Snowbird's conduct (under Rule 59(a)(1)) in presenting that evidence, entitles
Dr. Ereren to a new trial,
D.

JUDGE LIVINGSTON COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
EXCLUDING DR. EREREN'S PROFFERED REBUTTAL
EVIDENCE REGARDING THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF JUMPING IN
THE LOCATION WHERE DR. EREREN TESTIFIED THE SKI
INSTRUCTOR HAD POSITIONED HIM.

During trial, and in support of its position that Dr. Ereren's account of
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what had occurred was most improbable, Snowbird personnel (Bob Black (R.
1411, Tr. 241-43; 245; 249-50) and Shirley Durtschi (R. 1412, Tr. 310-11))
testified that the area described by Dr. Ereren is one where skiers and
snowboarders infrequently, if ever, jump. Dr. Ereren and his counsel, who
from the highway witnessed a number of people jumping in that area during a
later, short visit to Snowbird (R. 1412, Tr. 455-56), were surprised by that
testimony. Dr. Ereren attempted to introduce rebuttal evidence and proffered
that that evidence (R. 1412, Tr. 404-06; 410; 412), testimony from local lawyer
and skier, Bob Gilchrist, would be that, for years and years, Mr. Gilchrist had
seen people frequently jumping in that area. Judge Livingston ruled (R. 1412,
Tr. 412) that that rebuttal evidence would not be permitted.
The proffered evidence was genuine rebuttal evidence which would have
supported Dr. Ereren's case and would have appropriately negatively impacted
the credibility of the Snowbird personnel who testified regarding the supposed
improbability of Dr. Ereren's account. Dr. Ereren did not know that Snowbird
people, who had never been asked about this specific subject during their
depositions, would testify falsely on this subject until trial. Judge Livingston
abused his discretion in refusing the proffered rebuttal testimony, and that
abuse of discretion, given the critical issue of credibility in this trial, entitles
Dr. Ereren to a new trial.
E.

JUDGE LIVINGSTON ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DR. EREREN'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL,

The erroneous rulings of Judge Wilkinson and of Judge Livingston, and
the conduct of Snowbird, discussed hereinabove, were the focus of Dr. Ereren's
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Motion for a New Trial and supporting Memorandum (R. 1278-89) and Reply
Memorandum (R. 1364-74). Under Rule 59(a)(1) a n d / o r Rule 59(a)(7) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Dr. Ereren was, and is, entitled to a new trial.
Rule 59(a)(1) provides that a new trial may be granted based on:
[Ijrregularity in the proceedings of the court ... or adverse
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by
which any party was prevented from having a fair trial.
Rule 59(a)(7) provides, as another basis for the granting of a new trial,
"error in law." Under either of these grounds, as the foregoing discussion,
Dr. Ereren's counsel trusts, makes clear, a new trial should have been granted;
and Judge Livingston abused his discretion in denying Dr. Ereren's Motion for
a New Trial.
VIL

CONCLUSION

By all reasonable analysis, if Dr. Ereren's account of what occurred is
true, he is entitled to substantial compensation from Snowbird. Ms. Durtschi
acknowledged (R. 1412, Tr. 459-61; 477-78) that it would be "unsafe'' for a ski
instructor to position someone in the kind of location where Dr. Ereren testified
he was placed by the ski instructor. There was no testimony to the contrary.
The Snowbird personnel who were asked agreed that a trust relationship exists
between a skier and his instructor. E.g., R. 1411, Tr. 228; R. 1414, Tr. 235.
No one disputed that proposition. No one suggested that Dr. Ereren was
negligent. No questions regarding Dr. Ereren's putative negligence appeared on
the Special Verdict form (R. 1257-59). The relative percentages of fault of
Snowbird and of the unidentified snowboarder, who was never apprehended,
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would have been a subject of fair debate among the jurors, but it is virtually
inconceivable that a jury would have found that the Snowbird instructor's
placing Dr. Ereren in that location amounted to an "inherent risk of skiing" or
that the snowboarder had 100% of the causal fault or anything close to that.
Dr. Ereren testified (R. 1412, Tr. 463-64) that he had played in "physical"
basketball leagues and that he thought, in the immediate aftermath of the
incident, that he would be okay. But he got worse, and the evidence from his
neurosurgeon (R. 1413, Tr. 555-94), from his neurologist (R. 1413, Tr. 616-43),
and from himself {e.g., R. 1412, Tr. 473-74) was that he had sustained a neck
injury requiring that he undergo surgery, that he could and should no longer
perform most of the kinds of surgeries he had performed prior to the incident,
that he was in pain, and that his condition was permanent. That evidence was
unrebutted. Snowbird called no medical witness.
Dr. Ereren's economic loss expert testified (R. 1413, Tr. 699) that
Dr. Ereren had sustained several million dollars in economic losses. It was
stipulated (R. 1244) that he had sustained in excess of $46,000 in surgical and
other medical expenses by reason of his neck injury. Dr. Ereren ? s claim for
general damages was, and is, also substantial.
This Court, in Roundv v. Stalev, 984 P.2d 404 (Utah App. 1999), ordered
a new trial in a situation in which the defendant wrongfully refused to produce
a surveillance video of the plaintiff (superficially viewed, something that would
impact only questions of damages) in a case in which, by virtue of its
determination of the liability issues, the jury never reached the question of

29

damages. In Roundv, this Court acknowledged (id. at 409) that "a
determination of liability in this case hinged on the parties' credibility." This
case also hinges on credibility.
Without the evidence that this Court must assume, under Askew, would
have been produced had Snowbird voluntarily complied with, or been ordered
to comply with, Dr. Ereren's subject discovery requests, Dr. Ereren had to go to
trial without corroborative evidence. Dr. Ereren's credibility was directly
attacked by Snowbird's introduction of extrinsic evidence prohibited by Rule
608(b) and by Snowbird's introduction of evidence, which Judge Livingston
should have excluded, concerning his bankruptcy and gambling history.
Dr. Ereren's credibility would have been enhanced and the credibility of
Snowbird would have been appropriately undermined had the Court allowed
his proffered rebuttal evidence.
This Court, as mandated by Askew and on the strength of the Roundv
analysis, and based on the erroneous rulings of Judge Wilkinson and Judge
Livingston and the conduct of Snowbird, and in the interest of justice, should
order a new trial. This Court should also by its opinion make it clear that, on
remand, Snowbird must be required to produce the information and
documentation that are subjects of the discovery requests at issue and should
direct that, on retrial, Snowbird be prohibited from introducing impermissible
extrinsic evidence and impermissible evidence regarding Dr. Ereren's gambling
and bankruptcy history.
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VIII. NO ADDENDUM NECESSARY
Dr. Ereren's undersigned counsel represents that no addendum is
necessary under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/ ?

day of November, 2001.

PETER C. COLLINS
JACQUELYNN D. CARMICHAEL
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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